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I  
In his book The Wealth of Networks, Yochai Benkler begins to establish 
the foundations that would, for him, provide the basis for thinking 
electronic environments, digital connectedness, and the information 
economy as an opportunity for people to join together and to share. 
Network culture, he tells us in this book, can allow us to reassert the 
principle of liberty, not the anarchic libertarianism that often 
characterized attempts in the 1990s to understand what connectedness 
means in a context of digital production and distribution, but a polity 
that remains rooted in the principle of reasoned participation in an 
inclusive and open democracy. Against the monetizing of the Internet, 
Benkler retains a speculative faith in network culture, finding in it an 
architecture for a shared and open economy – a distributed system of 
exchange - that can free social production from the proprietary ethic 
that the market seeks to impose on all aspects of public life. To this end, 
he sets out the criteria that would characterize the networked public 
sphere: it must have a universal constituency, filter appropriate material 
for its relevance, ensure the reliability of information in the public 
sphere, appropriately synthesize diverse opinions, and be independent 
from government control.1  
 
Benkler picks up and broadens this project in his 2011 The Penguin and 
the Leviathan, a book which seeks to establish a model of the human as, 
in essence, co-operative, generous, honest, and altruistic. This model he 
contrasts with two – related – approaches that in the West have 
conceived human motivation fundamentally as a self-interested pursuit 
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of rewards. The first comes from Hobbes’ Leviathan, which tells us that 
to be human is to be mercenary and narcissistic (a self-interestedness 
for it that must be controlled by an authoritarian state); the second – 
from Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations – again asserts our essential 
greed and egocentrism, though here of course regulation should come 
from the equilibrium that the market imposes on our behaviour. Against 
both approaches to ownership and social production, Benkler turns to 
Rousseau, Hume, and Proudhon to argue that we are capable of moral 
action – that we are ‘wired’ virtuously – because we have a disposition 
towards cooperation and generosity; this other model he finds 
exemplified in the open distribution of Linux code, and he finds in 
Linux’s icon – Tux, the penguin of Benkler’s Manichean title – an 
alternative image of how systems can work to enhance sharing. 
 
For Benkler, the systems that we have recently created provide an 
opportunity to construct a new social order, one that departs from the 
idea of incentive- or reward-based production and rejects the idea that 
online association is about the narcissistic amplification of self. This 
model for the social would instead be founded on the principal of free 
distribution and equitable exchange that Benkler locates in peer 
production networks and open source software, as well as in new 
business practices that are promoting co-operative working 
environments. This model is not only to be found in Linux, he writes, but 
also in Wikipedia, Facebook, Twitter, in IBM, Google, Toyota, Southwest 
Airlines, and in the Chicago police department. Evidence for this faculty 
for co-operation is located by Benkler not only in our recently emerged 
social environments or in new organizational practices, but in biological 
and neurospychological research which points to ‘a predisposition to 
cooperate’ (13). Contrary to what we might assume, he tells us, ‘there 
is much evidence that evolution may actually favor individuals (and 
societies that include these individuals) who are driven to cooperate 
with or help others, even at cost to themselves’ (13). 
 
The persuasive force of the polemic that Benkler’s book brings to this 
moment of networked narcissism is often seen to come from its 
interdisciplinarity, with how it connects the concept of co-operation 
across the social sciences (economics, sociology, political science) and 
between the social and physical sciences (including evolutionary biology 
and neuroscience); in other words, with how it understands cooperation 
in the broader context of how the human, for some, is now understood. 
It is, however, important to note the limits of this interdisciplinarity, and 
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perhaps most immediately Benkler’s refusal to consider those disciplines 
from which approaches and perspectives have emerged to throw into 
doubt the primacy of the human as actor and agent, as the source and 
centre of value in the world. The Kantian legacy that joins Husserl, 
Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida, and Nancy in a shared contestation of the 
anthropocentric conception of man is nowhere acknowledged, even 
when it touches on the idea that technologies connect the world 
together. There is no sense of the conceptual inheritance which, by way 
of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze, points to the management of the 
self as a social resource, as well as to the mechanisms that enable such 
regulatory practices,2 and neither is there any acknowledgement of the 
more recent articulation of a recorporealized or cognitively different 
successor to the agent installed by humanism.3 
 
The Penguin and the Leviathan’s apparently inclusive and 
comprehensive, but in important ways restricted, appetite for conceiving 
the human that shares and connects means that it misses an 
opportunity to rethink not only the production of the social but also the 
production of the self in the context of today’s connectedness. Benkler’s 
book misses this opportunity because it doesn’t extend its 
understanding of the concept of sharing, on which it places so much 
value, to a sufficiently careful consideration of who or what shares 
across networked connections. In its sense of what connection has the 
potential to offer, Benkler’s model remains strangely unconnected to 
any questioning of the subject that becomes conjoined in acts of 
sharing; in its fascination with the possibility for co-operation, it remains 
strangely uninterested in the idea that cooperation might not begin with 
the individual. Instead, it takes as axiomatic the notion that it is the 
subject as agent who operates and has the capacity to connect with 
others – and to build an economy based on the bonds of amity, on trust, 
honesty, and generosity. This review will consider some of the problems 
with this model, not to question Benkler’s basic petition for co-
operation, or his plea that we should depart from the narcissism that is 
so often promoted online. Rather, the idea of the subject that is 
fundamental to Benkler’s appeal for co-operative social production – the 
idea that this entity has a capacity to share – requires greater 
consideration than it receives in The Penguin and the Leviathan. 
 
Two problems can be identified in respect of this subject who can share. 
First, there is the recent conceptual legacy that Benkler inherits but 
does not acknowledge. What can be traced across apparently divergent 
approaches to network sociality is an ontology that construes the self as 
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an indivisible centre around which communities, cultures, and societies 
aggregate. Community, we are repeatedly told throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, is what the individual now has the capacity to attain and to 
experience; this is community populated by the subject as user, the 
connected citizen who chooses to share across networks and social 
media platforms. Such a sense of this domain of the liberated self 
extends across a range of – often otherwise discrepant – claims about 
the ethics, politics, economics of network and digital culture. Ultimately, 
these approaches to distributed and network production tell us, we 
should enter into connected communities because they will make each 
of us better.  
 
Second, and relatedly, The Penguin and the Leviathan provides no 
analytic of Being that would allow the rigorous establishing of common-
based cooperation as an ontological predisposition, rather than as the 
disposition that Benkler describes. In Benkler’s book, the commons and 
the community that network cooperation allow are seen to be founded 
on the exemplary figure of the human that is not only the beneficiary of 
co-operative and distributed production. This figure is also assumed to 
be transcendent and sovereign, existing before and independently of its 
association with others. For Benkler, as with so many other responses to 
digital and network culture, this exemplary figure is taken to be self-
evidently in possession of itself, indivisibly proper to itself.  
 
Here the status of The Penguin and the Leviathan as an interdisciplinary 
study is decisive. Benkler’s apparent interdisciplinarity is a limited one, 
since it neglects consideration of a group of disciplines that have a long-
standing engagement with the figure that is both central to, and taken 
as axiomatic by, Benkler’s celebration of sharing. Apart from some brief 
opening and closing remarks on philosophical approaches to the 
morality or social function of benevolence and self-interest, The Penguin 
and the Leviathan has almost nothing to say about debates in the 
Humanities regarding the potential for collaborative and co-operative 
exchange; this lacuna results in an inattention to the kinds of thinking 
that have an historic attachment to the idea that being begins in a 
condition of shared exchange. Indeed, we might reasonably claim, such 
a consideration is intrinsic to, and a fundamental part of, the 
Humanities. Humanitas, the concept generally credited with 
inaugurating the Humanities, sets in motion a tradition of thinking that 
ties sharing to citizenship, collaborative exchange to what is universally 
human. The concept of humanitas might also have provided Benkler 
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with the suggestion that there’s something not wholly convincing or 
coherent about the idea of the human as a sovereign self-determination 
that joins with others in acts of shared association, in a fraternity that 
binds the social together. 
 
II 
The concept of humanitas emerges in Cicero’s 44 BCE De Officiis [On 
Duties]. Here, Cicero seeks to establish a sense of decorum, of 
appropriate and proper conduct; he does this by setting out ‘a doctrine 
of the supreme good’ and by connecting this doctrine normatively to a 
code of conduct that would provide practical rules for the regulation of 
daily life. Formulation of these rules for Cicero would best emerge 
through rational and voluntary acts of self-reflection, through the 
assumption of moral responsibility, through the cultivation of the self, 
and through participation in public assembly. And art and literature are 
essential to this conception of civic association; in the aesthetic realm, 
Cicero tells us, we find the significance of propriety – the effort to 
acculturate and civilize– to be most evident. What would emerge out of 
this rational, poetic, and artistic pursuit of the social and cultural are 
values that he says are ‘self-evidently’ true: beauty, harmony, 
friendship (in the form of fraternity and fellowship), justice, generosity, 
nobility, courage, honesty.  
 
Underwriting this model of good conduct is a concept of the self both as 
capable of independent action and as connected to the social sphere, 
and De Officiis proposes that there are four roles or personae that shape 
the human and allow it to attain the good. We are ‘invested by Nature 
with two characters’ (1.107) Cicero initially tells us: first, each of us has 
reason bestowed upon us; this bestowal is what allows the establishing 
of a shared morality and a shared sense of propriety. Humanitas is to be 
found, he writes: 
 
in the connection [coniunctissimus] subsisting between 
the members of the human race; and that bond of 
connection is reason and speech, which by the 
processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, 
discussing, and reasoning associate men together and 
unite them in a sort of natural fraternity. (1.50) 
 
Second, and co-existing with natural fraternity, there is the character 
that ‘is assigned to individuals in particular’ (1.107). In other words, 
each person possesses – or, more precisely, is given – a singular 
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interiority. To these he adds two more personae: character is shaped by 
the contingent and unforeseeable (when, where, and to whom we are 
born), and it is further developed through the choices we make (the 
paths we choose to follow from those available to us). What these 
personae combine to form is a self that is fundamentally disposed to 
good conduct, and since it recognizes its co-existence with others, it can 
therefore respect their needs. When manifest in daily life, this 
connection with the good is to be found in a just system of ownership 
and distribution, a system that is structured not around proprietary self-
interest, but in the interaction between the private and the public, 
between ownership and sharing; here, what bonds the social together is 
a personal responsibility that is directed towards the enhancement of 
mutuality.  
 
Two problems arise out of this model of the self and its social location, 
arriving first in Cicero’s work and then iteratively, and implicitly, 
restaged in Benkler’s account of the networked commons. First, the idea 
that four personae comprise the human fails to hold when Cicero tells us 
that one of these personae has primacy, constituting the source of the 
common bond – with the others coming later to complicate and to 
situate contextually this primary character. Although Cicero seems to be 
overwhelmingly concerned with social connection (with justice, with the 
equitable distribution of property, with sharing and fraternity), 
subtending this model is a sense of individual disconnection, of the 
individual as an ontologically distinct entity that has the potential to 
associate with others. Certainly, he suggests this when he characterizes 
humanitas as a connection between members of the human race; his 
term coniunctissimus suggests a condition of linking, adjoining, 
conjunction, and contiguity; in other words a meeting of things that are 
separate, of people who are independent before meeting others, and 
remain autonomous in their interfacing with each other. According to 
this model, the individual is, in its most primordial sense and even when 
in the presence of others, indelibly itself. 
 
Second, Cicero is unable to establish this selfhood as self-sufficient. 
Although our potential for mutuality begins in reasoned self-reflection, 
there is also – there has to be – something before this beginning. 
Initially, this antecedence appears in De Officiis as Nature: Nature is 
what gives us our capacity to act, to be self-determining, but also a 
desire for affiliation. ‘Nature has endowed every species of living 
creature with the instinct of self-preservation… and of procuring and 
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providing everything needful for life’ (1.11), he writes. But man is 
marked out from ‘the beasts’ by being granted an exceptional capacity 
for rational thought, and it is reason that inspires men to associate with 
each other: ‘Nature… prompts men to meet in companies, to form public 
assemblies and to take part in them themselves’ (1.12). So humanitas is 
rooted in a self which is not self-sufficient, a self that in its uniqueness is 
guaranteed by the exteriority that is Nature.  
 
But even Nature itself is seen to be is insufficient. It appears early in De 
Officiis as the authority that grants our capacity to act and to associate, 
our predisposition to mutuality and to sharing with others. And yet, 
later, this Nature is seen to be within the domain of the gods, for it is 
they, Cicero writes, who give the self its agency, who provoke us into 
wanting to associate and to share. Those who act against this 
predisposition to the common bond are, according to De Officiis, 
contravening not Nature but the transcendent order of divine creation. 
Those who indulge their own self-interest, those who recognize no 
responsibility to others, those who recognize no bond of citizenship – 
such people for Cicero spurn the sovereign gift that has been bestowed 
upon them. ‘Such people’, he writes, ‘must be considered as wickedly 
rebelling against the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship 
which the gods have established between human beings’ (3.6). So the 
self is here tied up in an onto-theology in which its mastery – the self as 
its own property or its own proximity to itself – is never enough. Man’s 
masterful self-presence or self-ownership here, as is so often the case, 
is seen to be the effect of another, higher, absolute, transcendent, 
exterior authority that assigns sovereign interiority. Put otherwise, this 
exteriority renders man dependent in the very moment that he is seen 
to be most independent.  
 
Such a sovereign uncertainty we can also find in responses to network 
culture that view it as the effect of users’ tendency to forge communities 
and to share within these spaces. For Benkler, as for Cicero, it is nature 
that gives, nature that produces what it means to be human, nature 
that grounds the ethical because in it, Benkler tells us, we can find 
evidence at the physiological level of an interior constitution that inclines 
towards benevolence, generosity, humanitarianism, altruism, and so on. 
‘Current evolutionary science’, he tells us, ‘is beginning to explain why 
cooperative behaviours are passed down both culturally and genetically’ 
(38). Such a claim means, of course, that the self here ceases to be the 
cause or source of action, but is merely the effect of another, higher 
sovereignty – an authority that gives the individual the capacity to 
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operate and to cooperate. Benkler, then, seems at some level to 
recognize that it is not enough to say that the self is the source of value, 
even as he finds the self to be the creative maker of the social, the 
entity that can engage in the willed act of opening itself up to sharing. 
 
But what’s missing here, and what Cicero’s slippage from nature to the 
gods reveals, is that nature can only be invested with value if there is 
some other, higher, sovereign authority - a supreme and supernatural 
cause – that renders value absolute, a metaphysicality or a theology 
that can guarantee the value of cooperation onto which Benkler holds 
with such resolve. The Penguin and the Leviathan recognizes the way in 
which this slippage has traditionally structured thinking about nature 
and value when this book points to a long-held, though for it flawed, 
attachment to the concept of nature: ‘Since the days of Augustine, 
scientists, scholars, and theologians alike have looked to the Book of 
Nature as a window into God’s mind’ (30). Perhaps because it is 
incompatible with his model of virtuous conduct, Benkler is reluctant to 
undertake such an appeal to a sovereignty that is more supreme than 
nature, to something that would establish nature as the source of a 
human inclination towards cooperation. Instead, because he doesn’t 
consider what makes nature virtuous or values valuable, there is a 
theological hole that Benkler consigns to the margins of his thinking, 
and this gap is most evident when he describes some kind of mystical 
authority that for him guarantees value and virtue: ‘We’ve all known, 
intuitively, that we aren’t really selfish and rational all the time’, he 
writes, ‘We’ve all done things because we knew intuitively that they 
were simply the right thing to do’ (19). 
 
This lacuna – this silence about what grounds, gives, dispenses, 
delivers, or bequeaths sovereignty – is what the Humanities can help us 
to address since, as the case of Cicero demonstrates, the attempt to 
think humanitas is what inaugurates the Humanities. Today, if we want 
to think about how we might begin with a more persuasive ontology – 
how we might develop a model of sharing that does not so awkwardly 
reach for a theology of value – then we might find such a model in the 
kind of work that Benkler touches on, very briefly, in The Wealth of 
Networks. ‘The twentieth century’, he writes here, ‘saw a wide array of 
critique, from cultural Marxism to poststructuralism and postmodernism. 
However, much of mainstream liberal political theory has chosen to 
ignore, rather than respond to and adapt to, these critiques’.4 
Mainstream political theory, he goes on to say here, does not fully 
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consider the possibility that cultural structures shape the individual, and 
for him a persuasive sense of self-determination would have to take into 
consideration the context within which the individual lives and acts. 
Crucially, though, this consideration ‘does not require that liberal 
political theory refocus on culture as opposed to formal political 
institutions’. Put otherwise, liberal theory needs to think about how 
individuals make, and can remake, political institutions, rather than be 
hampered with questions about the individual as an entity made in or by 
culture. Despite acknowledging ‘a wide array of critique’ in the twentieth 
century, Benkler, in The Wealth of Networks, then goes on to dismiss 
this array as in any way relevant. In The Penguin and the Leviathan, he 
refuses even to mention these modes of critique, let alone notice the 
Humanities as the place from which they unfold.  
 
To conclude, I want very briefly to suggest just one of the ways in which 
connecting – or, more accurately, re-connecting – Benkler’s loosely 
Ciceronian notion of humanitas to the Humanities might have allowed 
him to develop a more provocative sense of the self that shares. For 
Jean-Luc Nancy, sharing and co-operation are not actions that lie within 
our sphere of volition; it’s not that we can decide to behave in 
accordance with our nature because each of us is hardwired to be aware 
of others, or have within us an innate respect for the ethic of mutuality. 
Rather, sharing – his term is partagé, to share with, but also to divide, 
apportion or split – is what effects the immanence of the human. We 
come to presence rather than arrive complete as a plentitudinous self-
presence: ‘being-with or being-together’ is ‘the primordial ontological 
condition’,5 he writes in Being Singular Plural, so sharing – partage - is 
not what we do but what we are. We neither make the social nor are 
wholly made by the social, since, in our co-appearance (‘compearance’ 
(com-parution)6) with others, the social also arrives. Co-operation 
becomes, then, an ontological demand rather than an ethical and active 
pursuit of the good. And such a demand does not require us to anchor 
the good in a theology of value that would leave humanitas either in the 
uncertain state of dependent freedom or as something we know 
intuitively. Perhaps this is the point at which we might begin to think 
about the opportunities offered by today’s social environments and 
networks, not to establish what we might or might not do to connect 
with our disposition to co-operate, but to think about whether these 
environments and networks allow us to reconnect with our 
predisposition to be with others. If it is the individual, rather than a 
singular plurality, that operates here, then it is not a place where 
sharing is possible. 
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